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Special International Zones in Practice and
Theory
Tom W. Bell
ABSTRACT
The French Republic had a problem. Foreign nationals had
flown into the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport near Paris and
claimed the right to stay as refugees seeking asylum. Unwilling
to have the supposed refugees imposed upon it, France resolved
to process their claims without letting them into the country.
How? By keeping them in the airport’s international transit
zone—the area between the exit doors of airplanes arriving from
abroad and the far side of customs and immigration clearance.
This split border allowed France to summarily process and
(typically) deport the foreigners while keeping them outside the
country’s territory for asylum purposes. When detainees got
seriously ill, France created so-called “floating international
zones” to take them to a local hospital, a portion of which became
a temporary international zone. These French innovations in
border control inspired Hungarian transit zones, Australian
migration zones, and similar partial territories across the planet.
Few people beyond government attorneys and human rights
workers have heard of that particular kind of special
international zone, but most people know of the airport transit
zone—an area where foreign travelers can catch connecting
flights without going through local border controls and buy goods
free of local customs, duties, or taxes. Research uncovers still
other institutions that aspire to rise above merely local rules,
including the United Nation’s headquarters and CERN
laboratories. Each of these species fits within a more general
Professor, Chapman University Fowler School of Law. Copyright 2018 Tom W.
Bell. For material aid, useful information, and worthy challenges, the author thanks:
Nicolas Germineau, Marc Collins, Sherry Leysen, Matthew Flyntz, Michael Castle Miller,
Kelly Ryan, Mark Frazier, Johann Thusbass, Sevan Chorluyan, Greg Knott, Joe Quirk,
Mark Frazier, and Chapman University, Fowler School of Law. Disclosures and
disclaimer: Although the author does or did provide consulting services for projects under
the Honduran ZEDE system, to The Seasteading Institute (pro bono) in its effort to secure
an MOU with French Polynesia for a Floating Island Project in that country, and to Blue
Frontiers Pte. Ltd., for its SeaZone, this article does not represent the views of any
principal, agent, or business associate of the author, who alone bears responsibility for its
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genus, the special international zone (“SIZ”): An area that its host
nation state places outside of its territory for the purpose of some
local laws, leaving other such laws and applicable international
obligations in force. Special international zones already exist in
great number and variety. They continue to spread, grow, and
adapt. This article introduces SIZs as objects worthy of study on
many counts, but most particularly because SIZs offer nation
states a mechanism for selectively unbundling their territorial
services in response to necessity, the constraints of international
law, and promotion of the public good.
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INTRODUCTION: NATION STATES BY DEGREES
In 1992, at the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport outside
Paris, the French Republic had a problem. Foreign nationals had
flown into the airport and tried to stay as refugees seeking
asylum. The government regarded the claims as bogus and the
supposed refugees as mere economic migrants attempting to
exploit a loophole in international law. Unwilling to have
unwanted foreigners imposed upon it, France came up with a
clever solution: It would process the supposed refugee’s claims
without letting them into the country.1
How did France work this bit of legal legerdemain? By
keeping the foreigners within de Gaulle’s international transit
zone—the area between the exit doors of airplanes arriving from
abroad and the far side of customs and immigration clearance,
beyond which lies France proper.2 Exploiting this bubble in its
border allowed France to summarily process and deport most of
the supposed refugees while keeping them outside of the national
territory for purposes of claiming asylum.3 Voilà.
As the days dragged on, the French built accommodations for
the foreigners within the airport’s international zone, forcing them
to choose between staying within its confines or leaving the country
entirely. That kept them safely outside of France’s territory for
immigration purposes. Eventually, though, the foreigners suffered
medical conditions requiring hospital treatment. So the French
designated certain vehicles as floating international zones and used
them to transport the patients to a local hospital, relevant parts of
which they also designated as temporary international zones.4 This
entire archipelago of fixed, floating, and temporary zones, specially
created to allow foreign nationals to stay within the geographic
borders of France but outside of its immigration or asylum
territory, lawmakers called zones d’attente pour personnes en
instance (“ZAPI” or “zones d’attente”).5
This French innovation, turning international transit zones
into extra-territorial pre-asylum processing areas, proved both
popular and controversial. It rapidly spread to other countries,
mutating in the process, giving rise to Hungarian transit zones,
1 See TUGBA BASARAN, SECURITY , LAW AND B ORDERS: AT THE LIMITS OF L IBERTY
3 (2010).
2 Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile [Code of entry and stay
of foreigners and of the right of asylum] art. L221-2 (Fr.) [hereinafter CESEDA art. L221-2].
3 See BASARAN, supra note 1, at 50–64.
4 See id. at 59.
5 See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
298 (2005); F. Julien-Lafferrière, Le traitment des demanderus d’Asile en Zone d’attente
entre théorie et réalité, 1238 HOMME & MIGRATIONS 32, 32–36 (2002).
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Australian migration zones or excised territory, and similar
devices in countries across the globe, under names such as
reception area, transit area, or detention area.6 Faced with
similar problems at sea, the United States declared its territorial
waters outside the reach of national and international laws
applicable to asylum-seekers.7 Some countries have even
declared the decks of their ships extraterritorial zones, allowing
them to rescue and return migrants without affording a venue for
asylum claims.8
The advent of this new species of institution alarmed
commentators, who criticized the supposedly extraterritorial zones
as fictional, illegal, and illiberal.9 Judicial authorities, in contrast,
have gone no further than demanding respect for preexisting
international obligations.10 Thus, scrutinized and somewhat
tempered, zones d’attente and similar special international zones
have come to play an important role in regulating the global flow
of asylum seekers, economic migrants, and others seeking to enter
unwelcoming nation states.
Most people know of just one kind of international zone: the
airport transit zone, where foreign travelers can buy goods free of
customs, duties, or taxes and catch connecting flights without
going through local border controls.11 Students of international
law may have heard of still more obscure examples of nation
states willingly rolling back their effective borders, such as they
have done for the United Nation’s headquarters and CERN’s
laboratories.12 In each of these and similar cases, such as the
French zones d’attente, the same general pattern repeats: A
nation state designates a portion of its geographic territory as
outside the reach of some local laws, leaving local laws still in
effect and preexisting international obligations unchanged.
Given their shared features, growing practical importance,
and common theoretical challenges, these legal institutions need
6 Boldizsár Nagy, Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization
Instead of Loyal Cooperation, 17 GERMAN L.J. 1033, 1048–49 (2016) (discussing migration
zones); Tugba Basaran, Legal Borders in Europe: The Waiting Zone, in A THREAT AGAINST
EUROPE?: SECURITY, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 63, 64 (J. Peter Burgess & Serge
Gutwirth eds., 2011) (discussing other zones).
7 Immigration Consequences of Undocumented Aliens’ Arrival in United States
Territorial Waters, 17 U.S. OP. O.L.C. 77, 79 (1993).
8 Tugba Basaran, Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion, 2 INT’L POL. SOC.
339, 343 (2008).
9 See infra Section II(A).
10 See, e.g., Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826 (holding that France could
not unilaterally place part of its territory beyond the scope of Article 5, section 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, pertaining to detention of protected persons).
11 See infra Sections I(A), II(C).
12 See infra Section I(E).
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a shared name. The term “special economic zones” (“SEZs”) offers
a model because SEZs also represent discrete areas where a host
country applies unique, and usually less burdensome, financial
and business regulations. Hence the term adopted for this article:
Special International Zone (“SIZ”).
Summarizing the examples to follow, this article defines as
an SIZ:
An area that its host nation state places outside of its
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving
other such laws and applicable international obligations
in force.
Special international zones already exist in great number
and variety. They continue to spread, grow, and adapt. What
does the future hold for SIZs? Perhaps more of the same—but
worse. A country could take France’s example too far, for
instance, creating special border areas and floating personal
temporary microzones that together have the practical effect of
keeping entire regions and populations outside the country’s
national territory in terms of legal rights and privileges, while
putting them firmly inside the territory in terms of police powers.
Or SIZs might evolve in a more benign direction, creating
refugee cities for homeless populations, “deep blue” zones for
seasteads, or special international residency and work (“SIRW”)
zones for digital nomads.13 All these and other options become
possible once the general concept of a SIZ—a designated area
outside the reach of some local laws but still subject to
international obligations—has been defined, illustrated, and
explained. If that appeals, read on.
After this Introduction, Part I of the article surveys
contemporary legal practices to discover SIZs regulating trade
and travel across the globe through SEZs, international transit
zones, duty-free retail areas, pre-asylum waiting areas, and other
variations on the theme. Part II reviews the scant extant
commentary on special international zones, especially criticisms
of pre-asylum waiting areas, to develop a theory of special
international zones under which they might redeem themselves
as instruments of public policy. Part III applies that theory to
describe some possible forms of future SIZs. The article concludes
by explaining how special economic zones can promote the public
good by providing a means for nation states, under the
constraints of international law, to selectively unbundle their

13

See infra Part III.
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services, by placing select territories outside the reach of some
local laws by placing them within SIZs.
I. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN PRACTICE
This Part describes special international zones as observed
in the field, so to speak, in the many places nation states have
deliberately rolled back their powers, leaving a void filled by the
governing influences of international trade, travel, and
cultural exchange. The little-celebrated, but indisputably useful,
international transit zone, described in Section I(A), fits
squarely within the definition of a SIZ. Other examples fall at
its edges. Section I(B) describes a class of zones—special
economic zones—that do not so much import international law
as simply let the default level for customs, duties, and taxes
revert to their default level—zero—in the absence of a nation
state. Section I(C)’s topic, the duty-free retail area, likewise
serves the international community by setting certain parts of a
nation state’s territory beyond the reach of its powers.
Pre-asylum waiting areas, discussed in Section I(D), do the
opposite; they leave some of a nation state’s territory or guests
within the reach of its power, but outside the comfort of its
rights and privileges. In these areas, the chaos of international
human migration smashes into the hard edges of state power.
These, too, represent special international zones of a type—a
distinctly dystopian one. Ending this survey of SIZs on a lighter
note, Section I(E) offers a collection of other interesting species
in the genus.
A. International Transit Zones
International transit zones ease the transition between a
host state’s territory and the places beyond, including the
territories of other sovereigns and the ungoverned international
commons of the sea and sky. The zone turns the border from a
thin, solid line into a thick, complex, modulated buffer.14 So far as
passengers and their luggage are concerned, international transit
zones typically extend from the point of departure from the craft
arriving from abroad—the exit door of a foreign airplane, for
instance—to the inside border of immigrations and customs
control. They ease international transit by allowing passengers to
touch down on the host’s territory without passing through

14 See generally Jean-Baptiste Frétigny, Air Travel Opens New Understanding of
Borders: The Case of Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, ANNALES DE GEOGRAPHIE 1, 5
(2014), http://www.academia.edu/12970808/Air_Travel_Opens_New_Understanding_of_
Borders_ The_Case_of_Paris_Charles_de_Gaulle_Airport.
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customs and immigration controls. Though it arises more as a
gap between borders than as an entity unto itself, the
international transit zones satisfies the definition of SIZ
above: “An area that its host nation state places outside of its
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving other such
laws and applicable international obligations in force.”15
Like all SIZs, international transit zones come into being by
the choice of the local sovereign, which withdraws the effective
reach of otherwise applicable laws relating to customs, duties,
and immigration. Still other local laws, such as those forbidding
trafficking in forbidden drugs, remain in force. In almost all
cases (because almost all countries have joined it), the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (aka Chicago
Convention) requires that an airport treat transiting craft as if in
a customs and duty-free area.16 In other cases, such as in
implementing the special privileges shared by travelers among
Schengen Area countries, airports in particular countries may
configure their international transit zones to favor certain trips
or travelers.17
In addition to serving the quotidian needs of typical
travelers, international transit zones have won a storied place in
diplomatic relations by serving as temporary (and sometimes not
so temporary) holding pens for people caught between being
arrested at home and becoming a political problem abroad.18
Consider the case of Eric Snowden. Offered shelter of sorts by
Russian authorities, who evidently sympathized with his crusade
against elements of the United States government, he was
allegedly housed in the international transit zone of Moscow’s
Sheremetyevo International Airport; or perhaps, in a move akin
to that used by France to justify scattering zones d’attente across
its territory, in a more comfortable location nearby temporarily
designated as extra-territorial by the Russians in pursuance
of their campaign to irk the Americans.19 But more on that
ploy anon.20

See supra Introduction.
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 24, Dec. 7, 1944.
Frétigny, supra note 14, at 13–15.
Mehran Karimi Nasseri, an Iranian refugee, lived within the international transit
area of Terminal 1 at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport from 1988 to 2006. See Frétigny,
supra note 14, at 21.
19 Brian Palmer, What’s Life Like in an Airport Transit Zone?, SLATE (July 2, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2013/07/edward_snowden_has_spen
t_a_week_in_a_transit_zone_at_moscow_s_airport_what.html [http://perma.cc/CZ8G-QC9V].
20 See infra Section I(D).
15
16
17
18
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B. SEZs and Related Special Jurisdictions
The World Bank defines SEZs as “demarcated geographic
areas contained within a country’s national boundaries where the
rules of business are different from those that prevail in the
national territory.”21 Through SEZs, in other words, a host offers
a haven from the status quo that prevails elsewhere in the
national territory. As such, SEZs represent a kind of special
international zone—one wherein the host country rolls back the
scope of customs, duties, taxes, and other select impediments to
commerce, leaving in their place nothing but lots of freedom on a
thin layer of international law.
SEZs come in many types, including free trade zones, export
processing zones, and wide-area hybrid export processing zone
freeports.22 They come in many sizes, too, ranging from a portion
of a single factory to metropolitan areas housing millions.23
Though not SEZs in the modern sense, areas governed by special
rules have existed almost as long as government itself. SEZs
proper have enjoyed special vigor in recent decades.24
To better understand how SEZs as a class qualify as a kind
of special international zone, consider the Foreign Trade Zones
(“FTZs”), which are popular in the United States.25 FTZs lay
within the country’s borders geographically speaking, but “are
treated for purposes of the tariff laws and customs entry
procedures as being outside the customs territory of the United
States.”26 The board charged with administering the zones thus
considers them “outside the customs territory of the United
States for the purposes of duty payment.”27
By design, being outside the customs and excise taxes area of
the United States offers a considerable inducement to
transshipment and import-export processing services. Other
benefits follow from the extra-territorial status of FTZs, too. If a

21 Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci, Introduction to SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 3 (Thomas Farole &
Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011) (quoting Claude Baissac, Brief History of SEZs and Overview of
Policy Debates, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE AND
LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 23 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011)).
22 Id. at 2.
23 See id.
24 See TOM W. BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?: FROM THE NATION STATE TO
STATELESS NATIONS 19–27 (2018).
25 See Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a–81u (2016); Regulations of the
Foreign-Trade Zones Board, 15 C.F.R. § 400 (2018). Section 81c(a) distinguishes between
FTZs and the customs territory of the United States.
26 Scope, 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c) (2018).
27 Preface to FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, 78TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FOREIGNTRADE ZONES BOARD TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (2016).
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processor in the zone works imported materials into goods
destined for the United States proper, the processor can choose to
have the requisite duties assessed on either the value of the
materials as imported or the value of the finished goods that
include them—a useful option for accounting reasons.28
Merchandise brought into a zone for shipment abroad can be
counted as exported immediately, before it physically leaves the
United States, for purposes of federal excise taxes and
drawbacks.29 Also, consistent with the notion that in a federal
system, no individual state can have a territory greater than the
United States to which it belongs, personal property stored in the
zone falls outside the scope of state and local ad valorem taxes.30
By withdrawing the reach of select federal and state laws
back from the border of FTZs, the United States effectively
cedes governance of such matters to international law, such as
it is in these matters. And in the sorts of matters that concern
FTZs—customs and taxes—international law mostly is not. As
with the duty-free zones discussed next, in other words, FTZs
represent special areas where international rather than local
law has real effect.
C. Duty-Free Retail Areas
A duty-free retail area functions as if it were outside the tax
area of its host country for a select few people: passengers leaving
for abroad. It allows them to purchase certain goods—typically,
luxury ones such as liquor, cigarettes, or perfume—on condition
that they immediately remove them from the host’s tax territory.
The law of the United States, for instance, defines a duty-free
retailer as “a person that sells, for use outside the customs
territory, duty-free merchandise that is delivered from a bonded
warehouse to an airport or other exit point for exportation by, or
on behalf of, individuals departing from the customs territory.”31
Duty-free retail areas are thus defined not only by limits on
a map, but also limits on behavior. Which transactions classify as
“duty-free” depends not merely on where they happen, but also
on the intent of the purchaser. More generally than that, with the
advent of market-defined “Traveler Spaces” catering solely to the
needs of ticket-bearing passengers passing through international
transit zones and “duty-free prices” outside such zones designed to
28 William G. Kanellis, Comment, Reining in the Foreign Trade Zones Board:
Making Foreign Trade Zone Decisions Reflect the Legislative Intent of the Foreign Trade
Zones Act of 1934, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 606, 618 (1995).
29 Id. at 618–19.
30 See Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81o(e) (2016).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1555(b)(8)(D) (2016).
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simulate the financial experience of shopping within them,
duty-free retail areas have come to symbolize places freed from the
usual, mundane social obligations.32
The ready availability of cut-priced alcohol, cigarettes, and
luxury goods drives home the point: duty-free retail areas
offer special zones beyond merely parochial local regulations.
Duty-free zones belong in “an in-between space, global in
dimension, whose strategies of appropriation are at odds with
those of the nation states.”33 Duty-free retail areas operate not so
much as a space on a map, or even as a label for some people, but
as an idealized special international zone, where nation states
withdraw their impositions, and the bland nothing of the
ungoverned commons allows as much trade in rich and
intoxicating goods as the market will bear.
D. Pre-Asylum Waiting Areas
As related in the Introduction above, France created an
innovative new kind of SIZ—zones d’attente—by placing areas
within the geographic boundaries of the country outside of its
territory for immigration and asylum purposes.34 This new kind
of SIZ began within Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport in 1992,
but quickly multiplied across France, growing in size and
number, and mutating into floating and temporary forms.35 From
France, pre-asylum waiting areas spread to other countries.36
They now represent a routine matter of local law, used across the
world, usually without much note, as one of several mechanisms
that nation states use to manage the flow of refugees, economic
migrants, and other wandering people.37
Why did the French create zones d’attente? Because, like
other signatories to the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”), it has promised to
give refugees within its territory a variety of rights and
privileges.38 France has bound itself to allow guest refugees to
practice their religion, receive identity papers, and travel freely
throughout the country.39 Most significantly, the convention
forbids France, like other contracting parties, from expelling or

Frétigny, supra note 14, at 22.
Id. at 25.
See supra Introduction.
CESEDA art. L221-2.
Basaran, supra note 6, at 64.
See BASARAN, supra note 3, at 8.
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Introduction to CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3 (2010) [hereinafter REFUGEE CONVENTION].
39 Id. at 17, 28–29.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
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returning refugees to the country’s borders if to do so would put
his or her life or liberty at risk for certain reasons, such as on
account of race, religion, or social group.40 France doubts that the
economic migrants showing up at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle and
its other ports of entry qualify as “refugees” for purposes of the
Refugee Convention, but if they can make it onto French
territory, they can make a play for the status, thus winning at
least temporary admittance (which by dint of flight often
becomes de facto but illegal permanent admittance). France thus
created the zones d’attente to, in effect, push back the border of
its territory for purposes of those seeking asylum under the
Refugee Convention.41
How did the French create the zone d’attente? The applicable
provision of the civil code begins by giving the zone tightly
defined boundaries, saying it “extends from embarkation and
disembarkation points to where immigration checks are carried
out.”42 From there, though, the lines quickly get broader and
blurrier. The zone may also include, “in transit areas or near
the railway station, port, or airport, or near the place of
disembarkation, one or more places of accommodation providing
the concerned foreigners with hotel-type services.”43
The zone d’attente can thus grow within the boundaries of
the existing international transit zone. The largest of France’s
immigration detention centers is located next to the runways of
Roissy-Charles de Gaulle, for instance, ensuring that those
housed in the zone receive frequent and unpleasant reminders of
their tenuous status in the country.44 Given that they arise by
mere administrative fiat, a zone d’attente could also be added to
the edges of an existing international zone, making up a larger
complex of associated but distinct SIZs.45 The French have done
far more than that, though.
The civil code also stretches the zone d’attente to any place
the unwanted alien must go for administrative procedures, such
as to attend an off-site asylum hearing or “in case of medical
necessity.”46 Through that provision, the French can justify their

Id. at 30.
BASARAN, supra note 3, at 56–59.
CESEDA art. L221-2.
Id.
Morgane Iserte, Enquête en « zone d'attente réservée » de l'aéroport de ParisCharles de Gaulle: vers une gestion sécuritaire des « flux migratoires » [Investigation into
“Waiting Area” of Paris-Charles de Gaulle], 71 CULTURES & CONFLICT 31, 33 (2008).
45 CESEDA art. L221-2. The article's first line gives power to set the zone's
boundaries to “the competent administrative authority.”
46 Id.
40
41
42
43
44
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use of floating and temporary zones. The creativity of French
lawyers does not end there, however. The code even provides for
the creation of a retroactive temporary zone d’attente that runs
from where and when any group of ten or more foreigners has
arrived in France from outside a border crossing to where they
are discovered, up to twenty-six days later.47
Commentators have not always treated the French zones
d’attente with the highest regard, calling them fictional, illegal,
and illiberal. This article reviews those critiques below.48
Regardless of such theoretical musings, though, the zones
d’attente did and do exist. Indeed, they have been booming.
Courts have shaped the operations of zones d’attente, as
when the European Court of Human Rights held that France
could not detain foreigners without counsel indefinitely.49 This
commentary and judicial guidance operates only at the edges,
though. These sorts of pre-asylum waiting areas, because they
help nation states regulate the flow of refugees, economic
migrants, and other wandering people, will not go away any time
soon. Whether called migration zones, excised territories,
reception areas, transit areas, or detention areas, these SIZs will
play a continuing and important role in international law.50
D. Other Special International Zones
This Section reviews some other special international zones.
It offers only a small sample of what a more complete catalog
might include: SIZs ranging from ancient sanctuaries to nascent
block chain governments, with references to the many privileges
traditionally associated with diplomatic personnel, friendly
foreign military forces, and non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”).51 The examples could include SIZs as well known as
the United Nations’ headquarters,52 or as obscure as Canada’s
temporary surrender of sovereignty to aid the birth of a princess
in exile.53 The “other” SIZs reviewed here: CERN and the special
administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.

47 Id. France is not alone in retroactively creating pre-asylum waiting areas. See
BASARAN, supra note 3, at 91 (discussing Australian retrospective regulations).
48 See infra Part II.
49 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826.
50 Nagy, supra note 6, at 1048–49; Basaran, supra note 6, at 64.
51 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 66.
52 HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 350 (1950) (describing the origins and effects of UN's
“headquarters district”).
53 Netherlands’ Princess Margriet born in Ottawa, RADIO CANADA (Jan. 23, 1992),
http://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1403696302 (recounting that in 1940, Canada temporarily
withdrew sovereignty over an Ottawa hospital room in order to ensure that the birth of
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1. CERN
The European Organization for Nuclear Research, better
known as “CERN” from the acronym for its French name, the
“Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire,” offers a notable
example of how an international zone can create a safe space for
large scale investment, research, and development. CERN enjoys
a special status in the laws of the member countries that
together created and fund it. This status, set forth in the Protocol
on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Organization
for Nuclear Research (“Protocol”), exempts CERN’s property,
officials, and the family of CERN officials from customs, duties,
national taxes, and visa restrictions.54 This has the practical
effect of placing CERN properties, papers, and people in a sort of
special international zone.
Territory under the reach of particular national laws seem to
pull back where CERN touches down. The Protocol provides that
CERN’s real property—its grounds, buildings, and other
structures—“shall be inviolable” against the authority of any
“agent of the public authorities,” who may enter only with “the
express consent of the Director-General or his duly authorized
representative.”55 The organization, its property, its income, and
its imports and exports escape national taxation, duties, or
similar fees.56 The Protocol thus defines CERN’s special
international zone in both territorial and functional terms.
Although the Protocol reserves most of its benefits to CERN
“officials,” it defines that term broadly enough to cover a wide
range of employees, including “‘members of personnel’ as defined
in the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Organization.”57 These
people must pay a sort of internal tax “for the benefit of the
Organization,” but the salaries and emoluments they get from
the Organization remain “exempt from national income tax”
under the Protocol.58 In practice, therefore, most CERN
employment falls outside of any nation’s tax territory.

the Netherlands’ Princess Margriet there to her family in exile would not take place
under the cloud of a foreign flag, which might otherwise threaten her claim to royal
succession).
54 PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION
FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH (Mar. 18, 2004), http://cds.cern.ch/record/1035110/files/cer002693576.pdf [http://perma.cc/RVV4-S7UU].
55 Id. at art. 3(1), (2).
56 Id. at art. 6. Note, however, that this exemption does not extend to “the purchase
or use of goods or services or the import of goods intended for the personal use” of those
working for CERN. Id.
57 Id. at art. 1(d).
58 Id. at art. 10(2)(b)(i).
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CERN employment and residency falls outside of any
member country’s legal territory, too. CERN officials enjoy “for
themselves and the family members forming part of their
household, the same exemption from immigration restrictions
and aliens’ registration formalities as are normally granted to
officials of international organizations.”59 The Protocol renders
Organization officials exempt “from all compulsory contributions
to national social security schemes, on the understanding that
such persons are provided with equivalent social protection”
by CERN.60
The Protocol even puts CERN outside the justice systems of
its member countries. As befits an international organization, the
Protocol makes careful provision for the resolution of CERN’s
disputes in forums, such as in private arbitrations, that remain
outside the control of any one country.61 It could hardly be
otherwise, given the high stakes at issue—CERN’s cross-border
Large Hadron Collider cost almost U.S. $4.4 billion to build—and
the many national interests affected.62
Taken together, these provisions have the practical effect of
putting CERN property, papers, and personnel in a special
international zone. As in a French zone d’attente, these exemptions
apply only to certain activities and people. A CERN SIZ lies
outside not all national boundaries, but only the boundaries of
select customs, taxes, and visa laws. And like a French zone
d’attente, the status of a CERN SIZ can attach to particular
people, creating floating personal temporary microzones that
follow covered individuals even outside of the zone.63
2. Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau
Thanks to the history of European colonialism and the
vagaries of fate, the People’s Republic of China has adopted a
policy of “one country, two systems” with regard to both Hong
Kong and Macau, allowing each to exist within China’s national
territory as a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) with some,

Id. at art. 10(2)(c).
Id. at art. 11.
61 Id. at arts. 16–19.
62 CERN, LARGE HADRON COLLIDER THE GUIDE 17 (2017), http://cds.cern.ch/
record/2255762/files/CERN-Brochure-2017-002-Eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/RZK8-HX99] (listing
total price of LHC of 4.332 billion Swiss francs).
63 Appropriately enough, given its innovations with other sorts of SIZs, France had a
central role in the creation of CERN; the Convention forming it was written in Paris and
signed by France, naturellement. See The European Organization for Nuclear Research is
born, CERN, https://timeline.web.cern.ch/events/the-european-organization-for-nuclearresearch-is-born [http://perma.cc/YL2W-6BQT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2017).
59
60
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but not all, attributes of sovereignty.64 This policy, embodied in a
Basic Law adopted to govern each region upon its handover from
European powers to Chinese powers in the late 1990s, allows
Hong Kong and Macau responsibility over each of their local
customs,65 taxes,66 immigration,67 labor,68 and other areas of law
traditionally the sole province of a national government. These
SARs exist in a bubble of sorts—within the national Chinese
territory but without the legal territory of Chinese customs,
taxes, etc.
This special international zone is not, however, outside the
reach of all Chinese laws. When the law concerns matters closer
to the core of Chinese authority and pride, such as pertaining to
the applicability of international agreements,69 the supremacy of
the national constitution,70 or the adoption of flags and related
symbols,71 the SAR’s autonomy ends. Here, the national and legal
borders of China coincide, and the SARs exist in the same
territory(ies) as other parts of China.
In a functional sense, the Hong Kong and Macau SARs fit
the definition of special international zone set forth above. Both
have been placed by China outside its territory for the purpose of
some laws, leaving other Chinese laws and applicable
international obligations in force. Granted, the peculiar
circumstances surrounding the origins of those SARs makes
them very special kinds of SIZs. The colonial powers that China
convinced to peacefully abandon all claims to Hong Kong and
Macau, England and Portugal, respectively, did so only under the
promise that the newly formed SARs would enjoy considerable
autonomy. Query, therefore, if China ever had full title to the
powers hypothetically transferred. Did China withdraw its legal
territory from Hong Kong and Macau? Or did China decline to
fully expand to the SARs sovereign powers it enjoyed in adjoining
territories? In either event, Hong Kong and Macau offer
examples of a host country designating part of its territory as
beyond the reach of select national laws and leaving room for

64 See THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 1, http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_
full_text_en.pdf [hereinafter HONG KONG BASIC LAW]; MACAU BASIC LAW pmbl.,
http://www.umac.mo/basiclaw/english/pre.html.
65 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 116; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 112.
66 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 106, 108; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 104, 106.
67 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 154; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 139.
68 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 147; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 115.
69 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 153; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 138.
70 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 11; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 11.
71 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 10; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 10.
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international principles—here, those of a more cosmopolitan and
liberal world—to have effect.
II. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN THEORY
As documented above, special international zones have long
operated, in many guises, all across the globe, without much
incident. The SIZ has not, however, been subject to much
consideration as a theoretical object itself. Has it perhaps been so
ubiquitous as to escape notice?
Nation states have, after all, long relied on an intrinsic power
to reshape their interior borders as each alone sees fit. As Tugba
Basaran observes, “[t]he distinction between physical presence
and legal presence is not a new invention used for migration
controls only, but relies on historical precedents in different
contexts.”72 Citing ancient examples such as ancient sanctuaries
from prosecution, the special privileges of ambassadors, military
personnel deployed abroad, NGOs, and modern inventions such
as special economic zones, Basaran concludes that “[t]he creation
of outside spaces on the territory of the host state, placed under
an international or foreign legal jurisdiction, and thus not part of
domestic law, is an old technique.”73
In recent years, however, the advent of zones d’attente and
similar pre-asylum waiting areas has raised concerns that nation
states might be using SIZs not simply to reshape the scope of
domestic law, but to evade the obligations of international law.
This, in turn, has made the theoretical status of SIZs a pressing
matter. Hence this Part. Section II(A) relates the predominant
critiques of SIZs qua pre-asylum waiting areas: that they are
legal fictions, illegal, or illiberal. Section II(B) offers a way to
redeem SIZs in terms of theory, as refuges free from the
constraining effects of some domestic laws on the one side and
governed by principles of international liberty on the other. If
built to those specifications, (which admittedly cannot always be
said of pre-asylum waiting areas) SIZs fit nicely within the
existing theoretical framework, both positive and normative, of
international law.
A. Zones as Fictional, Illegal, and/or Illiberal
Although for the most part SIZs quietly regulate the flow of
international trade, travel, and cultural exchange without
incident, zones d’attente and other pre-asylum waiting areas have

72
73

BASARAN, supra note 3, at 66.
Id.
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drawn withering criticism. James C. Hathaway calls pre-asylum
areas “[a] particularly insidious mechanism”74 and “a legal
ruse”75 used by France and other nation states to avoid their
international obligations to refugees.76 Other commentators call
it “a fiction,”77 “legal fiction,”78 “arbitrary,”79 or, perhaps most
tellingly, as “places of illiberal practices.”80 Such critiques speak
too broadly, insofar as they condemn all SIZs, but justly target
the growing practice of nation states rolling back the borders of
local laws and protecting individual rights and privileges while
leaving in place local police, security, and penal laws.
Why do commentators direct such ire at pre-asylum waiting
areas? Because nation states arguably use them as a subterfuge
to avoid fulfilling their obligations under the Refugee
Convention.81 That international agreement has proven very
popular on paper; 146 countries have signed, including those now
hosting various sorts of pre-asylum waiting zones.82 In so doing,
each promised to afford several rights to refugees who find
themselves “in” or “within” the contracting state’s territory.83
And while no country is legally required to admit refugees,
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention says, “[n]o Contracting State
shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”84
Commentators argue that member countries violate this
principle of non-refoulement when they use pre-asylum waiting
areas to “expel or return” refugees “to the frontiers of territories”
where the enumerated threats await. Hathaway, for example,
after dismissing the zones d’attente as “a legal ruse” and citing
the seminal European Court of Human Rights case, Amuur v.
HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 298.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 298, 321.
Nagy, supra note 6, at 1048.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOST IN TRANSIT: INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR
UNACCOMPANIED MINOR CHILDREN AT ROISSY CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRPORT 5 (2009); see
also Lydia Gall, Dispatches: Asylum Seekers Stuck Outside Transit Zones in Hungary,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 4, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/04/
dispatches-asylum-seekers-stuck-outside-transit-zones-hungary.
79 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 5.
80 Basaran, supra note 6, at 70.
81 See generally REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38.
82 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ch. 5, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
83 See REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 17 (guaranteeing religion); id. at 28
(art. 27 guaranteeing issuance of identity papers); id. at 29 (art. 31(1)–(2) guaranteeing
“non-penalization for illegal entry or presence” and movements of refugees within country
of refuge).
84 REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 30.
74
75
76
77
78
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France, as authority, summarily concludes: “There is thus no
international legal difference between opting not to consider the
refugee status of persons present in ‘international zones’ or
‘excised territory’ and refusing to consider the refugee status of
persons clearly acknowledged to be on the state’s territory.”85
Human Rights Watch uses the same quick two-step citing Amuur
and other cases in support of the claim that such zones represent
nothing more than legal fictions used to hide violations of
migrants’ rights.86
The Amuur court gave these critics an irresistibly good
quote: “[d]espite its name, the international zone does not have
extraterritorial status.”87 In truth, however, like any holding, the
effect of Amuur’s words can reach no farther than the underlying
controversy allows. The dispute turned on application of Article
5, section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, a
provision directed at preventing wrongful detention. Specifically,
the court held that for France to hold the applicants in the zone
d’attente for twenty days “under strict and constant police
surveillance,” and without any “legal and social assistance,”
wrongfully deprived the applicants of their liberty.88
The Amuur court thus did not speak so boldly as its
oft-quoted words might suggest. Instead of ruling all
extraterritorial zones legal nullities—an issue not before the
court and quite beyond its power to decide—the court ruled only
that France had operated its zone d’attente in violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights.89 That much should
prove unremarkable.
The court did not and indeed could not forbid France from
drawing its territorial borders in ways that impact only local law,
or that leave its international obligations unimpeached. As proof
of the opinion’s limited effect, France responded to Amuur and
similar judicial corrections, not by abandoning its use of
extra-territorial areas, but by amending and expanding the use
of zones d’attente.90
Calling pre-asylum waiting zones “fictional” does not change
their very real impact. Calling the operation of such zones “illegal”
may or may not have an effect, as indicated by (sometimes)
HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 321–22.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 9–10.
Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 851.
Id. at 848–49.
Id.
See Gebremedhin v. France, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 174, 178 (holding that lack
of a suspensive clause in appeals from denials of asylum violates the Refugees
Convention).
85
86
87
88
89
90
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successful litigation.91 But what about calling pre-asylum waiting
zones “illiberal” (in the sense of “liberty-violating” rather than
of “leftist”)?
That is the concern voiced by Tugba Basaran, who argues
that through such devices, “liberal states can deny to particular
populations fundamental rights, which are the normative and
legal foundation of liberal states, whilst continuing to control
the very same space through policing powers.”92 Contrary to
commentators who view zones d’attente as fictional or per
se illegal, Basaran sees them as alarmingly mundane tools of
contemporary governance. “Border zones are legal constructions
and law is an ordinary means by which the liberal state
legitimizes illiberal practices.”93
On that view, at least in the guise of pre-asylum waiting
zones, SIZs allow nation states to roll back human rights while
leaving police powers in place. Indeed, in actual practice, most
hosts not only leave police powers in place, but considerably
augment them, surrounding the zones with fences and walls,
placing them under close observation, and creating an overall
experience, from the point of view of detainees and those tasked
to guard them, not far removed from a prison.94 The worst of
these pre-asylum waiting areas has, by credible accounts, added
not just detention, but punishment to the mix, offered in the form
of ad hoc abuse dished out by overburdened border officials.95
Sadly, but unsurprisingly, children have fared especially badly
when foreign migration flows have run into modern machinery of
border control.96 It offers scant consolation to the detainees
caught within such zones that they can exit back to the countries
from which they fled.97

91 For an example of unsuccessful litigation against the operation of a pre-asylum
waiting area, see Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria, 2005-XIII HRDC 289, 300, which held
that a three-day wait in an international transit zone at Vienna International Airport,
pending consideration of asylum claim, did not constitute unlawful deprivation of liberty.
92 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 1.
93 Id. at 7.
94 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 16, 42; see also Clémence Richard &
Nicolas Fischer, A Legal Disgrace? The Retention of Deported Migrants in Contemporary
France, 47 SOC. SCI. INFO. 581, 594–95 (2008); see also Julien-Lafferrière, supra note 5.
95 Sonia Wolf, Illegal Immigrants Suffer Beatings, Humiliation at Paris Airport:
Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE-ENGLISH 1 (Dec. 16, 2003).
96 See Kim Willsher, Boy of eight held at Paris airport for more than a week,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2016, 12:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/
boy-of-eight-held-at-paris-airport-for-more-than-a-week [http://perma.cc/QW5Y-RH94];
France: Unaccompanied Children Detained at Borders, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 8,
2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/08/france-unaccompanied-childrendetained-borders [http://perma.cc/HFK9-V6JM]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78.
97 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 849–50.
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The fractured nature of pre-asylum waiting areas abets their
use as instruments of illiberal government. They pop into
existence and disappear again, even appearing retroactively, at
the whim of mere administrators. They split like amoeba and
wiggle away in the form of floating and temporary zones. At the
farthest extreme, pre-asylum waiting areas become little more
than labels reading “unwelcome foreigner” attached to entire
populations in the form of myriad floating personal temporary
micro-zones. Far from a legal fiction, that describes how zones
d’attente function quite realistically.98 It may, however, qualify as
a legal absurdity.
It arguably mocks the meaning of “international” to call
these kinds of zones “SIZs.” Rather than areas between nation
states, pre-asylum waiting areas represent areas more fully
national and statist than anywhere else on earth. In them, the
softening graces of liberal government—its respect for human
dignity and its adherence to the rules of law—draw back, leaving
nothing but brute force.
On the charge of illiberality, then, the critics of zones
d’attente and similar pre-asylum zones lay a telling blow. Done
wrong, SIZs could allow nation states to violate their obligations
to human rights, the international community, and their own
citizens. How can theory set SIZs right? The next Section
suggests keeping the “international” in SIZ by ensuring that they
continue to promote free travel, trade, and cultural exchange.
B. Zones as Liberal International Refuges
The prior Section reviewed the theoretical critiques against
zones d’attente and similar pre-asylum waiting areas and found
one in particular especially telling: Such zones can serve as
instruments through which supposedly liberal states enforce
illiberal policies. This danger arises not only because nation
states find it expedient to shrink the effective territory of the
liberties and privileges they uphold while leaving the reach of
their police powers undiminished, but also because international
law has relatively little force to compel nation states to treat
foreigners more respectfully in special international areas.
Transit zones, SEZs, duty-free areas, and other SIZs typically
serve those aims in practice, of course. As yet, though, theory has
little to say about the matter. This Section begins filling that gap
by justifying special international zones not simply as
expressions of local power, but also as institutions that the

98

See BASARAN, supra note 3, at 54.
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community of nations accepts and respects as instruments for
promoting freedom of travel, trade, and cultural exchange.
It does not take much imagination to discern how SIZs could
serve as refuges to those traditionally liberal values. All of the
many types of SIZs reviewed above in Part I serve international
trade, travel, and cultural exchange in various ways. Some do so
obviously, as when international transit zones ease the passage
of travelers through a country or when free ports encourage
trade. Others do so indirectly, as when the Hong Kong and
Macau SARs allow liberal values to subsist in a sea of nominal
communism, or when, with the best of intentions but with mixed
results, pre-asylum waiting areas attempt to impose a measure
of order on the chaos of human migration.
These innate virtues of SIZs remain as yet underappreciated
as theoretical ideals. It could hardly be otherwise, given that only
in this article has the SIZ itself emerged as worthy of study.
Now, having identified it in the wild, so to speak, and come to
understand its ways, we can turn to directing SIZs toward
human ends. That exercise might begin by curbing mutations,
such as zones d’attente and other pre-asylum waiting areas that,
if unchecked, might remove whole regions and people from the
liberality of the nation state, but not coercive grip.
Again, it does not take much imagination to discern how to
save SIZs from that fate. Activists, reporters, and scholars have
brought the problem to the world’s attention. Amuur and other
judicial correctives on the scope of police powers imposed within
zones d’attente show international law working exactly as it
should, albeit at its usual glacial pace.99 No theoretical discussion
was needed to start that remedial process. Perhaps now it might
contribute to the effort, however.
As SIZs continue to grow, spread, and adapt in practice, our
theories about SIZs must keep pace. It ill serves our
understanding to dismiss them as fictional or illegal. SIZs are
no less real than any social institution and have become a
commonplace tool of international law. Good theory should
recognize the full potential, good and bad, of special
international zones.
Illiberality is not built into the DNA of SIZs; quite the
contrary. For the greatest part, during the long course of their
history and throughout their many instantiations, SIZs have
made international travel, trade, and cultural exchange more
99 See generally Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533 (1996); Gebremedhin v.
France, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131.

Do Not Delete

294

4/24/2018 4:55 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:2

cheap, easy, and safe. In this capacity, they have served as
powerful forces for peace, prosperity, and human freedom.
Recognizing this theoretic ideal might make it easier to reform
zones d’attente and similar pre-asylum waiting areas. It might
also help when it comes to designing new SIZs—the topic of the
next Part.
III. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN DEVELOPMENT
Having above described special international zones in
practice and theory, this article now turns to questions of
application. What might the next generation of SIZs bring?
This Part offers four examples: refugee cities, deep blue zones,
peer group country standards, and special international
residency and work zones. The following Sections address each
in turn, seriatim.
A. Refugee Cities
A select few policymakers and commentators have proposed
creating zones designed to give displaced people a more
appealing option than flinging themselves against the gates of
unwelcoming countries. Alexander Betts and Paul Collier have
called for the creation of special economic zones where refugees
might find gainful employment relatively close to home, rather
than in some far off European or North American country,
without unduly disrupting the local labor markets of the host
country.100 Refugee Cities, a 501(c)(3) public charity, proposes to
help host countries and NGOs implement a similar policy.101
Special refugee zones have already gotten a bit of traction in
the real world. The EU has entered into a compact with Jordan
under which productions from its SEZs will receive favored
access to European markets on condition that Syrian refugees get
to work alongside Jordanians (instead of, as is more typical of
refugee populations, being barred from local labor markets).102
That approach to aiding refugees has drawn criticism from
human rights activists, however, and no other such projects
appear in the offing.103 Perhaps would-be host countries worry
100 See ALEXANDER BETTS AND PAUL COLLIER, REFUGE: RETHINKING REFUGEE POLICY
IN A CHANGING WORLD 171–73 (2017).
101 REFUGEE CITIES, https://refugeecities.org [http://perma.cc/AV7C-46WB] (last

visited Dec. 4, 2017).
102 See European Union Press Release IP/16/588, Syrian Crisis: EU Ready to Step Up
on Partnerships with Lebanon and Jordan (Oct. 17, 2016).
103 See Heaven Crawley, Why jobs in special economic zones won’t solve the
problems facing the world’s refugees, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 6, 2017, 6:45 AM),
https://theconversation.com/why-jobs-in-special-economic-zones-wont-solve-theproblems-facing-the-worlds-refugees-75249 [http://perma.cc/SQK3-J6XX].
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about setting out to offer aid to those in need but ending up with
unwanted residents and citizens. A properly structured SIZ could
help fix that problem.
Structuring a refugee camp as a special zone that lies
outside the territory of its host country for purposes of many local
laws, including for the purpose of establishing the privileges of
residency or citizenship, would lower the risks of a host country
taking in refugees and other wandering populations. That would
make it easier for those suffering masses to find a place to rest.
Absent binding international obligations to the contrary, a
country should be able to create a SIZ outside of the host’s legal
territory for some purposes, such as for establishing rights to
residency or citizenship, without causing much of a diplomatic
stir. As noted above, such devices have become routine in many
contexts and countries.104
Done right, and reported fairly, such a refugee SIZ program
would likely win its host accolades. Who could complain if a
country willing to let foreigners onto its territory as an act of
humanitarian mercy, in response to an emergency situation,
redrew its legal boundaries to withdraw the full panoply of its
residents’ and citizens’ privileges and obligations from the foreign
guests? All the many other countries unwilling to give shelter on
better terms would, at any rate, have little grounds to criticize.
This outline of a legal framework for refugee SIZs leaves
many questions unanswered. Foremost among them: Would it be
right for a country hosting a refugee SIZ to deny those taking
shelter within the zone from free access to and from other
international zones, traffic, and travelers? The French zones
d’attente seem headed in that direction, but remain a lot more
like prisons than areas where local law has given way to
international norms. Tugba Basaran reports a trend toward
greater access, but notes that French zones d’attente remain
subject to strict limits, under which a few NGOs can access
certain parts of the zones, and certain parties therein, subject to
the unfettered discretion of the Minister of the Interior.105
Another question worth asking: Conceding that a host
country ought to have every right to deny a foreign sovereign the
right to govern some or all of a refugee SIZ, can it rightly deny
migrant people some form of self-government, if only that
provided by an NGO, or church, or some other organization short
of a competing sovereign nation? I should hope not, but should

104
105

See supra Part I.
See Basaran, supra note 8, at 350.
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also confess to a partial view of such matters, given professional
interests in the field.106 Refugee Cities seems to agree; it suggests
that “a regional, supranational entity, such as the EU, or a
collection of representatives from the host country and
neighboring nations, could establish the regulatory authority” for
the refugee cities it advocates.107 It also calls for giving the
residents of refugee cities various ways to get involved in
self-government.108
Only time will tell what form refugee cities will take, and
whether they will take form at all. Many other questions persist.
The problems that inspire the idea of special international zones
for refugees persist, too, though. Perhaps refugee cities, in some
form, will help to abate them.
B. Deep Blue Zone
French Polynesia has invited Blue Frontiers Pte. Ltd. to
submit plans for developing a new kind of special economic zone
in that country—a “SeaZone” encompassing both land and
water areas.109 The final legal structure of that special
jurisdiction will depend on action by the National Assembly of
French Polynesia. Even as a mere hypothetical, though, the
SeaZone presents an interesting exercise for the application of
the SIZ model. The seasteader’s unique situation—they seek
little more from French Polynesia than a safe nursery where
the first generation of their floating communities can grow
and mature in anticipation of eventually moving to the high
seas—calls for unique solutions.110 It calls, for reasons set forth
in more detail earlier and elsewhere, for a unique kind of special
international zone: a “‘deep blue’ zone.”111
What is a deep blue zone? It takes its name from the
prevailing color of the international waters of the planet, ocean
areas shared by the vessels of all nations, under the exclusive
control of none. The deep blue zone would recreate those areas in
simulated form by offering close to shore many of the legal effects
of staying far out at sea.

106 See BELL, supra note 24, at 219–33 (relating “stories of the sort ordinarily
recounted over drinks” about the author’s consulting practice).
107 Governance, REFUGEE CITIES, https://refugeecities.org/about-the-project/ourresponse/governance/ [http://perma.cc/4FUN-YDKA] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
108 Id.
109 BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
110 See generally JOE QUIRK WITH PATRI FRIEDMAN, SEASTEADING: HOW FLOATING
NATIONS WILL RESTORE THE ENVIRONMENT, ENRICH THE POOR, CURE THE SICK, AND
LIBERATE HUMANITY FROM POLITICIANS (2017).
111 See BELL, supra note 24, at 63.
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A deep blue SIZ would allow select foreign vessels to anchor
within the territorial or inland waters of its host nation on
terms designed to simulate those that apply in international
waters. This would change the rule ordinarily applicable in
territorial waters, wherein foreign vessels can typically do no
more than maintain innocent passage. 112 Because the host could
fine-tune the zone’s rules to disallow military vessels, resource
extraction, and other international rights ill-suited for inland
waters, the deep blue zone need not pose any unusual risks. At
the same time, the arrangement would give seasteaders a
protected harbor, both literally and legally speaking, in which
they could try out the arrangements they aim to someday use in
international waters.
If seasteaders make it out into the open ocean, for instance,
as they so ardently claim to want, they will find themselves
living in cities that, because they float in international waters,
will enjoy ready access to the world’s maritime trade. Vessels
flying the flags of many sovereigns will visit and trade with
seasteads. Furthermore, the seasteaders’ vessels will themselves
likely sport various flags, whether of nation states or, still more
hypothetically, of seasteading polities.113
Because each flag brings with it much of the substantive law
of the flag’s issuer, rendering the vessel flying it national
territory for some purposes,114 seasteads offer the prospect of
bringing many various polities together in close proximity under
fluid conditions. Just as the borders of ecosystems, such as where
a river meets the ocean, generate the greatest diversity and
growth, this polycentric feature of seasteads offers the prospect of
untold wonders or chaos. Such complex systems do not always
behave predictably. Through a deep blue SIZ, seasteaders might
reduce the rough and tumble of international seas and laws to
safe, controlled conditions.
C. Peer Group Country Standards
Special economic zones, for the most part, aim to offer little
more than areas free of customs, duties, and taxes, sometimes
with the added benefit of one-window service for any government
paperwork that persists. Zones competing on those fronts need
not reference the laws of other countries. Relatively recently,

112 See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
arts. 17–21.
113 See BELL, supra note 24, at 63 (discussing flagging options, including selfflagging seasteads).
114 See id. at 62.
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however, zones have begun to compete not only on the price and
convenience of governing services, but also on the applicable
rules.115 That opens the door for a zone that allows its guests to
choose rule sets from any of a number of pre-approved countries,
bringing international law to bear on what is ordinarily a purely
local question.
Though somewhat by historical accident rather than by
Chinese design, Hong Kong demonstrated long ago that
importing the right foreign laws to a special jurisdiction can help
it thrive. First as a Crown Colony and then, under a “Basic Law”
that maintained the legal system’s fundamental features after its
handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong has succeeded by offering
Asia a common law legal system relatively friendly to private
enterprise and high finance.116 Eager to replicate that success,
Dubai employed retired English judges, even fitting them out with
robes and perukes, and wrote “the laws of England and Wales”
into its legal system.117 Honduras plans to take the process even
further with its zonas de empleo y desarrollo económico (“zones of
employment and economic development” or “ZEDEs”), which
within broad limits will allow each zone to import common law or
other rules from public or private sources of its own choosing.118
These trends suggest that a future special international zone
might best satisfy the market demand for good rules not simply
by offering another country’s laws within its bounds, as in Hong
Kong or Dubai, nor even by offering a flag-free generic common
law legal system, as Honduran ZEDEs might, but by offering a
choice between any of the many rule sets that a variety of peer
countries would apply to a particular area of regulation. The host
would select the countries in its peer group on the basis of the
quality of their regulations, market demand for them among zone
clients, and their suitability given local conditions. A special zone
set up in Central America might choose to put all OECD
countries (thus including all members of EU and NAFTA) and its
neighboring countries in its peer group, for example. With regard
to some areas of regulation, guests could either stick with the
regulatory scheme that applies by default in the zone (which

See BELL, supra note 24, at 187.
See STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 273–77 (2004).
Law on the Application of Civil and Commercial Laws in the Dubai International
Finance Center, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, art. 8(2)(e) (U.A.E.), https://www.difc.ae/files/92
14/5448/9184/Law_on_the_Application_of_Civil_and_Commercial_Laws_in_the_DIFC_DI
FC_Law_No._3_oF_2004.pdf.
118 Decreto No. 120-1203, Ley Orgánica de las Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo
Económico (ZEDE) [Organic Act for Zones for Employment and Economic Development
(ZEDE)], LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL DEL LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS (Sept. 6, 2013).
115
116
117
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might itself come from outside the host country) or choose one
from a peer country.
Under peer group standards, for example, if a company that
manufactures and sells medical devices in the German market
decides to expand its operations to the zone, it could choose to
stick with the rules it has already mastered. The zone would not
try to master those rules itself, but would instead require the
company to certify that its practices in the zone, because they
follow those established in its home country, comply with
German law. This certification could be provided by the peer
country itself under special arrangement or by some trusted
third party. Upon offering its certification of compliance with
peer group country standards, the company would be allowed to
make and sell medical devices in the zone.
Though companies would probably often want to “bring to
the zone” the same regulations they have already satisfied back
home, thus saving the need to master another set of rules, a
company setting up in the zone could choose the regulations of
any peer country. It may turn out, after all, that all medical
device companies in the zone, even those from other countries,
will want work under German regulations.
In this way, a SIZ run on peer group standards could reveal
which countries, among those trusted to have reasonably good
rules, offer the sorts of regulations that protect the public while
encouraging economic development. That in turn might
encourage countries to compete for the coveted top spot in terms
of trusted but efficient regulatory services. This is not just a
matter of prestige, nor even of what revenue might be had from
selling certification services to parties invoking a particular
countries’ regulations within a zone that applies peer group
country standards. The countries that take the lead in offering
the world regulations that both protect the public while
promoting profit will give its domestic industry a great
advantage over foreign competitors, who instead of having
already mastered the prevailing rules will have to either play
catch up or suffer under the familiar but unpopular rules of their
own home countries.
D. Special International Residency and Work Zones
Future SIZs could also take a form designed to attract digital
nomads, voluntary exiles, and other parties eager to pay for
enjoying lower barriers to international travel, trade, and
cultural exchange. Enterprising host countries could serve that
growing market by offering special international residency and
work zones. This Section explains SIRW zones in greater detail.
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In a SIRW zone, a nation state would roll back its customs
and immigration border, legally speaking, and leave behind an
area open to visitors, residents, and workers from abroad. Like
French zones d’attente, these zones would begin as offshoots of
a pre-existing international transit zone. The usual tourist and
resident visa and work permit rules would not apply in a SIRW
zone. Other rules might apply of course; that depends on the host
government, the organization (probably private) that operates the
zone, and the international market for places to live and work.
Most likely, the SIRW zone would offer comfortable housing
and work environments for all its guests and expedited processing
of residency visas and work permits for those seeking stronger
links to the host country. To judge from current practices in
international transit zones, private parties will likely manage
SIRW zones under the host’s oversight.119 Instead of applying its
customs and immigration rules to the zone, the host would assess
a flat lease, per capita, or other fee. This would ensure that the
zone pays its way, in terms of public finances, while being treated
as a black box by the host country in terms of the taxation of (and
thus interference with) the zone’s internal operations.
Extant SIZs have come close to creating SIRW zones without
quite fulfilling all the criteria. Norway’s Svalbard Islands look like
one at first glance. As its welcoming website says, “[e]veryone
may, in principle, travel to Svalbard, and foreign citizens do not
need a visa or a work or residence permit from Norwegian
authorities in order to settle in Svalbard.”120 In contrast to the
voluntary process through which host countries ordinarily create
SIZs, however, Norway had to accept this limitation on its
sovereignty somewhat by force. It never had the right to impose
visa or work permit requirements in the islands, but rather had
to foreswear imposing those limits on nationals of other parties
to the Svalbard Treaty in order to win such control over the
islands as it now claims.121 It bears noting, however, that the
Governor of Svalbard, evidently not pressed for space, has
extended the invitation to all foreigners.122
Something akin to a SIRW zone also emerges from the
details of the Hawksbill Creek, Grand Bahama (Deep Water
Harbour and Industrial Area) Act, the legislative enactment of
an agreement reached between the government and the private

See Frétigny, supra note 14, at 15–16; see also BASARAN, supra note 3, at 102–03.
Entry and Residence, THE GOVERNOR OF SVALBARD, https://www.sysselmannen.no/
en/Visitors/Entry-and-residence/ [http://perma.cc/W747-M99G] (last updated Sept. 27, 2016).
121 The Svalbard Treaty art. 3, Feb. 9, 1920.
122 Entry and Residence, supra note 120.
119
120
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developer of a free port.123 The Act gave a new corporation, the
Grand Bahama Port Authority, Ltd., sweeping powers to create
and run the port, including responsibility for education and
healthcare, and exemptions from all manner of customs, duties,
taxes, and fees.124 More to the point for present purposes, it also
allowed the Port Authority (or its licensees) to bring to the
Bahamas and employ a broadly defined class of skilled workers
and their dependents, subject only to a government veto right
against identified individuals.125 This is not quite a SIRW zone,
but neither is it far from one.
In its full flower, SIRW zones would offer something of a
reflection of the pre-asylum waiting areas that France and other
countries have created. Instead of trying to drive migrants away,
a SIRW zone would try to convince them to come, stay, and work.
Like pre-asylum waiting areas, though, SIRW zones would exist
within a country’s geographic borders but outside of its territory,
legally speaking, for purposes of customs or immigration.
CONCLUSION: UNBUNDLING SOVEREIGNTY FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
This article has introduced the special international
zone—an area that its host nation state places outside of its
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving other such
laws and applicable international obligations in force—as a
distinct genus of legal institution worthy of close study. As Part I
documented, SIZs have a long history, already exist in great
numbers across many types, and continue to grow and adapt.
Their success should come as no surprise, given that SIZs prove
so useful in helping smooth the barriers, gates, and gaps between
nation states’ various territories. The theoretical foundations of
SIZs have hitherto remained rather undeveloped, however. Part
II began correcting that deficiency by defending SIZs as
irreplaceable tools for promoting the liberal ideals embodied in
free trade, travel, and cultural exchange. Part III applied that
theoretical approach to SIZs by describing special international
zones that might, if brought to fruition, promote peace,
prosperity, and human dignity.
Nation states usually follow the same business model as
cable TV companies: bundle many various services into an
indivisible whole. SIZs allow innovative nation states to offer
123 The Hawksbill Creek Agreement, GRAND BAH. PORT AUTH., http://www.gbpa.com/
index.php/about-us/the-agreement [http://perma.cc/9JME-JW2E] (last visited Jan, 22,
2018). The author thanks Mark Frazier for bringing this arrangement to his attention.
124 See generally Hawksbill Creek, Grand Bahama (Deep Water Harbour and Industrial
Area) [Hawksbill Creek Agreement], CH.261 (June 20, 1955) (Bah.).
125 Id. § 2(20).
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something like service à la carte. Whereas in most of its territory,
a government offers a single package of services—taxes,
regulations, policing, etc.—in a SIZ it can offer a curated
selection of these. In an international transit zone, for instance,
most of the usual laws apply with the exception of certain ones
relating to immigration and taxes. A SIRW zone might remove
labor regulations from the mix, too. A deep blue zone would
remove still other local restrictions, leaving international norms
to fill the gap. This, the power of special international zones to
regulate the territorial boundaries of nation states, stands to
work widespread and lasting changes on the structure of
international relations.

